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SETTING STANDARDS: THE COURTS, THE
BAR, AND THE LAWYERS' CODE
OF CONDUCT
Thomas Lumbard*
"[T]he ABA commission is working to write . . . a code for all
lawyers."
- Robert J. Kutak, Chairman, Commission on the Evaluation
of Professional Standards, American Bar Association, 1979.1
"[T]he Association . . merely promulgates a model code of
professional conduct for consideration by the state bodies regu-
lating the practice of law."
- Lawrence E. Walsh, President, American Bar Association,
1976.2
The most fundamental tenet of regulating the practice of law in the
United States is that it is a function of the state courts.' There are a few
"patent lawyers" who are not members of the bar, and some non-lawyers
who "practice" before various federal agencies, but the right to practice
law as it is usually thought of is generally conferred by the state courts,
and is generally subject to termination or suspension only by the court or
courts that conferred it.
The function of regulating legal practice is often said to be inherent in
judicial systems. Although the function has been ostensibly delegated to
the courts by legislation in some states, the basic theory is that all courts
have inherent power to regulate practice before them, and thus to deter-
mine who may, or may not, engage in such practice. That power has been
* A.B., cum laude, Harvard University, 1959; LL.B., cum laude, University of Penn-
sylvania, 1963. Member, New York and District of Columbia bars. Director, National
Board of Trial Advocacy. Associate Reporter, The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct.
I. 65 A.B.A.J. 1299, 1300 (September, 1979).
2. Press Statement issued by President Walsh (June 25, 1976), in response to the insti-
tution of United States v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 76-1182 (D.D.C. June 25, 1976), dis-
missed without prejudice, No. 76C-3475 (N.D. 111. Aug. 30, 1978), charging the ABA with a
conspiracy to restrain competition among lawyers, reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 981 (August,
1976).
3. In this context, "states" include Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.
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extended to all aspects of the practice of law, and is not just limited to
determining who may represent others before a court. This appears to
have been a natural concomitant consequence of the development of the
legal profession in the United States. Somewhat circularly, the "practice of
law" has come to mean "doing the things lawyers do," and thus the "unau-
thorized practice of law" has come to mean "doing anything lawyers usu-
ally do without a license to practice before the courts." Organizations of
duly licensed lawyers have been quite zealous in protecting the monopoly
thus conferred upon their members.
The fact that this has resulted in some "balkanization," under a federal
system in which each state is a separate sovereign entity, has been fre-
quently noted. Standards for admission to practice have varied widely.
Some states have granted automatic admission to all graduates of their
state law schools (the "degree privilege" system); some have been ex-
tremely liberal in granting reciprocal admission to lawyers admitted in
other jurisdictions; and some have had extremely rigorous requirements
for all applicants for admission. Only in recent years has residency in the
state come to be struck down as an almost universal requirement for ad-
mission to the bar.4
Similar disparities in the systems and standards for the disbarment, sus-
pension, and other discipline of lawyers have also been noted. These dis-
parities have been substantially reduced since the Clark Commission
Report of 1970' focused the attention of bench and bar on the most serious
defects in state disciplinary processes, and since the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) became the Uniform Code for lawyers' conduct in
all but name in the eleven years following its initial publication in 1969.6
Most of the improvement of state disciplinary systems during the 1970's
was accomplished by the courts exercising their rulemaking power, al-
though some improvements were the result of either legislation or the
threat of legislation. The adoption of the CPR was universally effected by
court rule in the states, and even the federal courts have furthered that
horizontal uniformity by adopting rules creating, in some states, vertical
uniformity between themselves and the local courts.7
4. See In re Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979); In re
Canons of Professional Ethics, Order No. 12500 (Mont. June 24, 1980).
5. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, ABA,
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Final Draft 1970).
6. The last of the 52 "states" to adopt, in one form or another, the CPR as its official
Code was Illinois, on June 3, 1980, see note 27 infra.
7. MODEL FEDERAL RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, Rule IV (approved by
the Judicial Conference, September 20, 1978; adopted by 15 United States District Courts as
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Some dissatisfaction with the CPR as originally promulgated by the
ABA surfaced during the process of its original adoption by the state
courts. The variations on the 1969 Code, as adopted by state courts
through 1975, were sufficient to create a volume half an inch thick, al-
though that volume did not include any of the most divergent code, Cali-
fornia's 1972 Rules of Professional Conduct.8 The ABA itself approved a
number of amendments to the CPR during the 1970's. Some, but not all, of
those changes were required by judicial decisions, and not all of those
amendments were adopted by all the states. In addition, not only did some
states respond to federal mandates by adopting amendments at variance
with the ABA's proposed responses, but some states amended their Codes
on their own initiative, without the spur of either new ABA doctrine or
federal case law.
The federal decisions, particularly Bates v. State Bar of Arizona' which
overturned the Code's ban on all advertising by lawyers, told the ABA and
the states what could not, constitutionally, be prohibited by a state-sanc-
tioned Code, and gave some hints as to what could still be prohibited. The
dicta and separate opinions (particularly that of Justice Marshall in In re
Primus'° and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n ") posed the vexing question
of what should be prohibited or allowed, within the new constitutional pa-
rameters of what could be prohibited. The ABA vacillated, but came down
in favor of regulations that were about as restrictive as a careful reading of
Bates would allow. It recommended two sets of Bates-CPR amendments
to the states, but only included the more restrictive set ("Proposal A") in
subsequent printings of the CPR. 2
Thus the ABA's response to Bates was to try to continue to enforce re-
strictions (in this instance on lawyers' advertising) that limited competition
among lawyers, or the individual lawyer's right to free speech, to as great
an extent as seemed prudent. Some conservative state bar associations
convinced their courts not to go even that far down the road to reform, or
to attach additional restrictions to those permitted by the ABA. Others
of September 1, 1980). See also, e.g., Local Rules of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, Rule 4 (July 1, 1979).
8. COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (June, 1977). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foil. § 6076
(West Supp. 1980) (adopted December 31, 1974, effective Jan. 1, 1975, 14 Cal. 3d 1 (1974)).
9. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
10. 436 U.S. 412, 468-77 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (opinion for two cases).
II. 436 U.S. 477, 468-77 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (opinion for two cases).
12. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT EC 2-6 through 2-15 and DR 2-101 through 2-105 (newly titled ABA MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1979)).
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adopted what the ABA had grudgingly approved as a liberal alternative
("Proposal B") to its basic conservative doctrine ("Proposal A"). But a
remarkable number, led by New York and California (with twenty percent
of the nation's lawyers), declined to follow either of the ABA proposals.
Some of them evidently concluded that Bates necessarily implied an abso-
lute constitutional protection for some activities the ABA still wanted to
regulate. As a result, some state courts simply rejected the ABA's con-
servative guidance and tried to adopt rules embodying their concepts of
what the law ought to be on lawyers' advertising and publicity.
The process of developing new policy in this area was remarkably liber-
ating for some state courts. Some held hearings. Some consulted the bar
and the public of their states in other ways. Those that did so developed a
realization that they were in fact not just approving rules for lawyers, but
legislating: developing rules that would affect all users and potential users
of legal services. These courts realized that in promulgating Codes of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, they were indeed, as Bates had held, giving such
codes the anticompetitive magic cloak of the state-action exemption from
the federal antitrust laws. They were acting as courts, and exercising a
judicial prerogative that some of them keenly wished to protect from legis-
lative preemption, a prerogative that might be left open to legislative at-
tack if it were too often used merely to rubber stamp ABA proposals.
Thus, in the wake of Bates, more state courts started to think for them-
selves about legal ethics than had ever done so before. They had trusted
the ABA; now they found that they had been led down the garden path.
The state courts even discovered-to stretch the metaphor-that it was the
courts, and not the ABA, that were stuck with the bills when their offspring
were found in violation of federal law.' 3
Bates and its progeny thus suggest that the American Bar Association is
not, as previously supposed, the appropriate fountainhead for the law of
legal ethics or professional responsibility in the United States. The brood-
ing omnipresence in Chicago has never been without substantial self-inter-
est in the "ethical" Canons, Codes, opinions, and rules that it has
promulgated, as Jerold Auerbach has demonstrated at some length.' 4 In-
deed, one of the ABA's motives, since it first purported to promulgate Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics in 1908, has evidently been to arrogate to itself
the defacto, if not dejure, function of being the ultimate authority on
questions of lawyers' conduct. That alone should render its authority sus-
13. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 100 S. Ct.
1967 (1980).
14. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1976).
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pect. The bonafides of nongovernmental bodies that exercise quasi-gov-
ernmental powers respecting matters in which they are interested are
always suspect.
Goldfarb v. Virginia. State Bar' 5 made it clear that, without the cloak (or
robe) of judicial state action, the ABA's practice of dictating to its mem-
bers, and to nonmember lawyers alike, how they could compete for legal
business was an attempt to restrain trade. In October, 1980, the Second
Circuit held in American Medical Association v. FTC'6 that the parallel
practices of the American Medical Association violated section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Subjected to similar challenge under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts in 1976, the ABA had escaped a suit filed by
the Department of Justice with a consent decree in which it agreed to stop
pretending, at least overtly, that its pronouncements on lawyers' ethics
were authoritative. 17 It agreed not to require ABA members to pledge al-
legiance to the Code as a condition of membership, and to call it the
"Model Code," instead of "The Code of Professional Responsibility." In
moving for dismissal without prejudice, the Justice Department stated that
the states in the wake of Bates had "approachcd the job of rewriting adver-
tising rules in a variety of ways," and that the new rules lacked the stultify-
ing uniformity of earlier versions.' 8 It concluded from this trend that:
There is, thus, both refreshing independence in decision making
and local variety in regulation: the ABA code clearly is no longer
the central or exclusive source for state rules and interpretations
concerning advertising by lawyers. For perhaps the first time in
this area, states and state regulators are independently creating
regulations to govern lawyer conduct.' 9
As we learned from Brown v. Board of Education,2 however, old habits
of repression die hard. Both oppressors and oppressed often cling to their
chains. Liberation is exhilarating for some, but threatening to others.
Whatever the cosmetic, superficial changes in the structure of the process
by which ethical standards are handed down by the gods of law, the ABA
15. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See also FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d
485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
16. American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, [1980] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 63,569 (2d Cir. Oct. 7,
1980).
17. United States v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 76-1182, (D.D.C., filed June 25, 1976),
dismissed withoutprejudice on motion of the Justice Department, No. 76-3475 (N.D. Ill., Aug.
30, 1978). See Justice Department Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, reprinted
in 64 A.B.A.J. 1538 (October, 1978).
18. Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1540.
19. Id
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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has continued to regard itself as the chief oracle in the field, even as it has
regretfully admitted its lack of divinity.
Or perhaps, as often happens in large organizations, the policy deter-
mined by the ABA's high command has not been effectively communi-
cated to the troops in the field. Most of the recent ABA assertions of
oracular authority in professional ethics have emanated from the "Kutak
Commission," whose alliterative nickname comes from its chairman, Rob-
ert J. Kutak of Omaha, Nebraska. The Commission and its capable Re-
porter, Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. of the Yale Law School, have
been toiling for almost four years on increasingly grandiose schemes to
rework the CPR. The hallmark of that work has been the assumption
(usually unstated) that, whoever may have the dejure power to write the
law of legal ethics, the ABA remains the highest authority in the field, de
facto.
Appointed in 1977 as a "Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards," the Kutak Commission quickly decided that mere evaluation
and amendment of the CPR was not enough. It reported to the ABA's
August, 1979 Annual Meeting that: "After several months of painstaking
research and discussion, the Commission has reached agreement that the
Code, to be effective, requires complete reconstruction rather than piece-
meal amendment . ,,2" The Commission, therefore, proposed total re-
shaping of the Code into a "Restatement" format, as well as a "complete
reformulation. ' 22 "The Commission has approached its assignment with
the intent to assess and evaluate the Code in terms of the remaining years
of this century. . . . We have not strayed from our original course of
striving to develop professional standards that are at once comprehensive,
coherent and constitutional., 23
The Commission was not yet willing to expose its work-product to the
world, although it intended to have that product ready for presentation at
the 1980 Midyear Meeting-an occasion then less than six months off.
The Commission was severely criticized, both by one of its own guest
speakers, Professor Monroe H. Freedman, and by the professional press24
for being so secretive with so important a project so close to the purported
21. COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, ABA, INFORMA-
TIONAL REPORTS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES I (Report No. 37, 1979 Annual Meeting).
22. Id
23. Id. at 2.
24. NAT'L L.J., Aug. 27, 1979, at 1, 12; id, Sept. 3, 1979, at 16; Legal Times of Washing-
ton, Aug. 20, 1979, at 1-2.
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D-Day. The press got the Commission's secret draft anyway,25 whereupon
the Commission went public with its next effort, a "Discussion Draft" enti-
tled "Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)."26
The format of the MRPC was, as predicted, a sharp departure from the
CPR. Taking a cue from those states that had not adopted the "aspira-
tional" Ethical Considerations of the CPR when they adopted its
"mandatory" Disciplinary Rules, 27 the Kutak Commission put out a
black-letter product consisting solely of "Rules," each followed by an ex-
planatory "Comment." This was not an enormous switch. But Kutak &
Co. also completely changed the sequence and numbering system of the
1969 CPR Disciplinary Rules. They accompanied their one hundred and
thirty-four-page discussion draft with a twelve-page MRPC-CPR, CPR-
MRPC table of related sections,28 but it contained several obvious and
curious blank spots. According to the table, the following Disciplinary
Rules would disappear if the MRPC replaced the CPR: DR 2-108, prohib-
iting "Agreements Restricting the Practice of a Lawyer"; DR 2-109,
prohibiting "Acceptance of Employment" in certain circumstances; DR 3-
101, proscribing "Aiding [the] Unauthorized Practice of Law"; DR 6-102,
prohibiting "Limiting [Lawyer's] Liability to Client"; and DR 7-105,
prohibiting "Threatening Criminal Prosecution . . .to obtain advantage
in a civil matter.",
29
Careful study of the MRPC reveals that these CPR prohibitions have
not really disappeared. They are subsumed, sometimes in broader, some-
times in narrower form, in various MRPC Rules. But this patent defect in
the only index provided with the Kutak draft suggests a certain arrogance:
"trust me," Mr. Kutak (or Professor Hazard) seems to say. It's there some-
where.
It was arrogant enough for the Kutak Commission to assume, with the
recent track record of the CPR there for all to see, that its ipse dixit would
be acceptable to the state courts. The further assumption that its product
should be bought on faith, when it could only be compared to prior law
25. See text printed in Legal Times of Washington, Aug. 20, 1979, at 8, 27-30; id, Aug.
27, 1979, at 26-47.
26. COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, ABA, MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as MRPC],
reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. I (Feb. 19, 1980) (special edition), and 59 MICH. B.J. 345 (June,
1980) (with cross-reference tables).
27. Most recently, Illinois. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, added to
Illinois Rule 771 by Supreme Court order entered June 3, 1980, effective July 1, 1980.
28. MRPC at 136-47.
29. Id. at 142, 144, 146.
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with difficulty, and when the Commission seemed to be hiding the ball,
approached sheer chutzpah.
Nor was that the end of Kutak's Napoleonic self-crowning. In August,
1979, having learned the tenor of the Commission's still-secret initial ef-
forts, the new president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
announced in his inaugural address that he too was appointing a commis-
sion to draft a new Code. Losing sight of the doctrine by which the ABA
had escaped the Justice Department's antitrust net, Kutak said he would
"welcome ATLA input . . . on responsibility code issues."3 Had he for-
got that he was chairman of the Professional Standards Commission of an
association whose pronouncements are mere "advice" to the state courts
which constitute the ultimate arbiters of responsibility code issues? So it
would seem. As the ABA Journal quoted him: "'. . . the ABA commis-
sion is working to write not just a code for a specialized area, but a code
for all lawyers.' . . . Writing a code is easy, Kutak said. 'I'm only per-
plexed at how they [ATLA] would enforce it.'
It was evidently inconceivable to Mr. Kutak that any group except the
ABA and the Commission he chaired could produce a viable and enforce-
able code. He could not recognize the fact that, in the free marketplace of
ideas about legal ethics created by Goldfarb, Bates, and the Virginia three-
judge court's recent decision in Consumers Union of the United States v.
American Bar Association,32 the ABA's ideas were no longer ex officio
those of the states. Four years of legal history had apparently passed him
by.
That indeed the ABA was no longer the emperor of ethical ice cream
became clearer as 1979 turned into 1980, and as that year ran its course.
In November, 1979, ATLA President Theodore I. Koskoff appointed his
commission-not through ATLA but through an affiliated, independent
body, the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation. Though
studded with ATLA luminaries, the Koskoff Commission included promi-
nent non-lawyers. One was a labor leader, and one a former Executive
Director of the ACLU.3 3 Among its lawyer members were the legal coun-
30. Lawscope, Trial Lawyers Group Parts Company with ABA on Ethics Code, Speciali-
zation, 65 A.B.A.J. 1299, 1300 (Sept., 1979) (indirect quote).
31. Id. (direct quotation as shown).
32. 470 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Va. 1978), vacated and remanded sub nom. Supreme Court
of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 99 S. Ct. 1967 (1980). The only effect of the
Supreme Court's remand was to change the theory on which CU's attorneys fees might be
assessed against the Virginia Court, and to render the Virginia State Bar equally likely to
have to pay such fees.
33. Edward T. Sullivan, Business Manager of Local 254, SEIU, Cambridge, Mass., and
Aryah Neier, now with the New York Institute for the Humanities.
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sel of the NAACP and the Executive Directors of both the ACLU and the
Consumer Federation of America.34 The Commission also featured two
state-court judges35 and two university professors from diciplines other
than law.36 The Reporter for the Koskoff Commission was Professor
Monroe H. Freedman-perhaps the most published writer on the subject
of lawyers' ethics in the United States.37
The Kutak Commission published its Discussion Draft MRPC in Janu-
ary, 1980. The bar's reaction was at best skeptical, and substantially an-
tagonistic-of which more later. In June of the same year, Koskofi's
commission countered with its Public Discussion Draft, entitled "The
American Lawyer's Code of Conduct" (ALCC).3 8 This too took the form
of a complete revision of the CPR. Unlike the Kutak Commission's
MRPC, however, the ALCC resembled the CPR in that each of its sets of
Rules was printed together, with explanatory matter that frequently illus-
trated both the interrelationship between the Rules in each "Part," and
how they related to Rules in other Parts. It also provided, to demonstrate
precisely its points of difference with both CPR and MRPC doctrine, "Il-
lustrative Cases." Here was a new phenomenon in legal drafting-apre-
annotated code. It carried the beginnings of its own decisional gloss, so
that there would be no doubt of the drafters' intentions. The contrast with
the Kutak MRPC, which was quite close-mouthed about its relationship to
prior law, was striking.
Again, press and professional comment was mixed, but the ALCC was
clearly viewed by those outside the Kutak Commission as a worthy rival to
the MRPC for adoption by the courts.39 The National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers printed the text of the ALCC Rules (without
the "Illustrative Cases" and "Comment") with the subheading: "ATLA
Alternative to ABA Disaster."4
Now there were two champions in the field. A third was already prepar-
34. Charles N. Carter, Ira Glasser, and Kathleen O'Reilly.
35. Judges Thomas L. Hayes, Superior Court of Vermont, and William S. Thompson,
Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
36. Hugo A. Bedeau (Philosophy), Tufts, and Gary T. Marx (Urban Studies and Plan-
ning), MIT.
37. See R. Temple, Letter to the Editor, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 20, 1980, at 14.
38. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ROSCOE POUND-AMERICAN
TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (public dis-
cussion draft released June, 1980) [hereinafter cited as ALCC].
39. See, e.g., Lindgren, Book Review, A.B.F. RES. J. 639, 642 (reviewing G. HAZARD,
ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1980)). See also Subin, War Over Client Confidentiality.-
In Defense of the Kutak Approach, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 19, 1981, at 22-23.
40. THE CHAMPION, Aug., 1980, at 2. The ALCC discussion draft has also been re-
printed in TRIAL, Aug., 1980, at 44.
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ing to enter the lists. At the same ABA Mid-Winter Meeting that first saw
the Kutak Commission's work in formal dress-indeed, before the ink was
dry on the MRPC's first printing-the National Organization of Bar
Counsel (NOBC) adopted a resolution condemning the Kutak Commis-
sion's "radical departure in form, style and substance" from the Code of
Professional Responsibility.4' The NOBC, a previously somewhat inactive
group, consists entirely of bar counsel-the disciplinary prosecutors whose
principal duty is the enforcement and interpretation of the state Codes.
Despite its lack of a prior track record as a promulgator of Codes, it was an
ominous antagonist for the Kutak or Koskoff Commission, for ATLA or
the ABA. Though small in number of members, NOBC is, on responsibil-
ity code issues at the state level, probably second in influence only to the
Conference of Chief Justices, or perhaps the Council of State Representa-
42tives that governs the National Center for State Courts, were it to take an
interest in such matters.
NOBC's February resolution said it would "submit its views to the
[Kutak] Commission with specificity at an early date. '43 To show that he
took the matter seriously, NOBC's President appointed his successor-elect,
Allen B. Zerfoss, Chief Disciplinary Counsel of Pennsylvania, chairman df
a special committee. Serving with Zerfoss on the four-man committee
were another state bar counsel, an assistant to the only bar counsel on the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and
a branch staff counsel of another state. The Zerfoss Committee drew up a
lengthy draft report consisting primarily of how the Code of Professional
Responsibility would look if the Kutak Commission's recommendations
were written into it-or rather, what Kutak & Co. would have written if
they had been willing to cast their recommendations in the form of a revi-
41. The Resolution was adopted by NOBC in Chicago on February 2, 1980. See
ZERFOSS REPORT, infra note 45, at 99 app. A.
42. The National Center for State Courts has been described by the Washington Post as
"a judicial think-tank." Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1980, at 31, col. 1. Started in 1971 with
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funds, the Center was designed to give state
court systems the same research-and-development support supplied to federal courts by the
Federal Judicial Center. It is run by a Board of Directors who are elected by the Council of
State Court Representatives. The Council consists of one member from each "state," includ-
ing Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia,
appointed by the highest administrative authority of the jurisdiction's court system (usually
the highest court, but sometimes a judicial council or conference). As of June i, 1980, 19 of
the 54 representatives were chief justices, and 21 were other justices, of highest courts; 4 were
judges of other courts; and 10 were the chief administrative officers of state court systems. 4
STATE COURT J. No. 3, at 44 (Summer, 1980).
43. Resolution of February 2, 1980, supra note 41.
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sion of the Disciplinary Rules of the CPR.' Whatever else it did, the
Zerfoss Committee thus provided the bench and bar with the cross-refer-
ence between the CPR and the MRPC that the Kutak Commission had
either found itself reluctant, or been unable, to provide.
The bar counsel group did not stop there. Meeting as a committee of the
whole at the ABA Annual Convention in Honolulu, NOBC went through
the Zerfoss Committee's draft report item by item, from start to finish, in a
session that took the better part of two days. As each item was debated,
points that were not the subject of clear consensus were put to the vote of
all members present. The final product was then approved on August 2,
1980, by a unanimous vote. After some redrafting and preparation of
clean copy for reproduction, the Zerfoss Report was printed and transmit-
ted to the Kutak Commission, and to the profession.45
The Zerfoss Report is a remarkable document in many ways. First, it
constituted the first authoritative attempt not just to plump for retention of
the format of the CPR, in diametric opposition to the Kutak-Hazard and
Koskoff-Freedman revisions, but actually to put that position in concrete
form. Of its one hundred seven pages, sixty-three 46 consist of existing
ABA (or "Model") CPR provisions (Canons and Disciplinary Rules), to-
gether with NOBC's recommendations for changes ("Proposed Rules"
and, in one instance, "Proposed Canon Retitling"47) and explanatory com-
ments. Twenty-eight pages consist of MRPC (Kutak) provisions "not rec-
ommended for adoption[,] together with reasons and comments.",48 The
last nine pages reproduce the February 2, 1980, NOBC Resolution49 and
give a Kutak-Zerfoss cross-reference table.
Because of its source, the Zerfoss Report is a formidable rebuttal of the
Kutak Commission's draft MRPC, both respecting its form and, on occa-
44. SPECIAL COMMITTEE, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, DRAFT RE-
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON STUDY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT, dated July 31, 1980 (actually completed and mailed to ABA Commission with
covering letter dated May 20, 1980).
45. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT ON A STUDY OF THE PRO-
POSED ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
(adopted Aug. 2, 1980, Honolulu, Hawaii) (Photo-offset, 107 pp. plus 3 unnumbered pages)
[hereinafter cited as ZERFOSS REPORT]; Covering letter from Allen B. Zerfoss, President,
NOBC, to Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. (Sept. 22, 1980).
46. ZERFOSS REPORT, supra note 45, at 7-69.
47. Compare ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon 9 (1979) ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety,") with ZERFoSs REPORT, supra note 45, at 67 ("A lawyer should safeguard
funds and property of others entrusted to the lawyer").
48. ZERFOSS REPORT, supra note 45, at 70-98.
49. Id. at 99-107.
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sion, its content. The only comparable document in recent legislative his-
tory is probably the Department of Justice's response to the proposed new
federal criminal code-and that was not, as this was, the work-product of
the lawyers who actually worked day-to-day with the existing codification.
The primary working professionals in the field of lawyer discipline were
thus criticising the work of a committee consisting of former ABA Presi-
dents, active and former judges, academics, corporate lawyers, and public-
interest types, together with the Yale professor and former ABF Director
who was its Reporter, and its two other law-teacher consultants. In short,
the NOBC was telling the Kutak Commission, as politely as possible, that
it didn't know its business.
Furthermore, the Zerfoss Report was extraordinary because it was
couched, at least formally, as NOBC's "recommendations to the [Kutak]
Commission."5 NOBC appears, on the surface, to be pulling its forelock
to the ABA and the Commission. It goes through the motions of defer-
ence-but so did lago to Othello, and Macbeth and his Lady to Duncan,
even as they plotted the overthrow of their gullible masters. One para-
graph, however, shows that this velvet glove conceals an iron fist:
The NOBC applauds the conscientious efforts of the Commis-
sion to improve the standards for the legal profession and pledges
its continuing efforts to assist. But it will continue to advocate
revision to the present Code without abandonment of its present
form, style and content for which most of us have developed great
familiarity and respect if not admiration. 5'
How smoothly the bar counsel organization says that it means business!
It pledges its continuing assistance but states in the next breath that it will
continue to advocate a position that is, in many respects, diametrically op-
posite to the position of those it says it will continue "to assist." The prefa-
tory section concludes by saying that NOBC "strongly recommends" that
the Kutak Commission "adopt the recommendations contained in this Re-
port in the general interests of the legal profession to improve and update
their ethical standards in the best form and manner possible. ' 52
To return to the point where we began, what NOBC is very gently tell-
ing the Kutak Commission is that the professional standards for lawyers
are not promulgated and enforced by the American Bar Association, or by
its Commissions and Committees: they are adopted and enforced by the
fifty-odd state courts of last resort, or lower courts with power to admit and
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id (emphasis in original).
52. Id
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to discipline the members of the bar;53 and that the bar counsel of the
states are, individually and collectively, the lawyers whom those courts
have appointed to perform the key enforcement function of exercising dis-
cretion to prosecute, or not to prosecute, allegations of professional mis-
conduct.5 4 NOBC has not thrown down the gauntlet to the Kutak
Commission. It has, however, at the very least, forcefully reminded the
Commission that its work is not only subject to review by the House of
Delegates before it can become ABA or national bar policy, but must also,
to obtain the force of law, pass muster with the fifty-odd rulemaking state
courts. And on that last lap-or, if you will, the fifty-odd last laps-it will
be the NOBC, not the ABA, that has the inside track.
The bar counsel also have many allies at an intermediate stage in the
somewhat Byzantine process by which recommendations, even from the
ABA, become amendments to the states' versions of the CPR. While each
rulemaking court has inherent authority to amend its CPR on its own mo-
tion, such action is somewhat unusual. Courts are much more likely to act
on the recommendation of their state bar groups, integrated or voluntary,
or at least not to act until the representatives of the lawyers whom they
govern have had their say. In the past, state bars may have had a tendency
to transmit the ABA's pronouncements on legal ethics to their governing
courts without change or even comment. Mere men, at what is sometimes
disparagingly called "the state level," did not question national oracles.
But that is changing. The men and women in the state bar associations
have become increasingly aware, through the study of such decisions as
Goldfarb, Bates, and Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union," that
the people at "the national level," the panjandrums of the ABA, are also
mere men (and occasionally women). Some of the state bar members,
black or Jewish, remember that the ABA refused to admit them to mem-
bership not so long ago. All of them know that it was one Virginia couple,
followed by two ordinary Arizona lawyers who held no bar committee po-
sitions whatsoever, who demonstrated before the Supreme Court that the
emperor of legal ethics was, in fact, but a group of naked, unaccommo-
dated men using their power, and that of state courts and bars, to restrain
53. In New York, this power lies with the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court,
divided into four geographic Departments; in Connecticut, it has been assigned to the Supe-
rior Court, the court of general trial jurisdiction.
54. See, e.g., Rules 27 E-27 L of the Superior Court of Connecticut, which authorize
each Local Grievance Attorney appointed by the court to appeal, to a Statewide Grievance
Committee, the dismissal of a misconduct complaint by a Local [Judicial District] Grievance
Committee, or the imposition of discipline short of a "presentment" to the court for public
discipline.
55. See note 32 supra.
19811
Catholic University Law Review
commercial speech and competition by and between lawyers. The state
bars must also be suspicious of the workmanship of the craftsmen whose
last "comprehensive, coherent" set of disciplinary rules (now renamed)
were sufficiently lacking in constitutionality to subject Virginia's courts
and bar to a substantial bill for the attorneys' fees of the consumer groups
who challenged them. In the well-worn cliche, the natives are restless.
ATLA and NOBC have, indeed, already been joined by several state bar
groups in opposition to the Kutak Commission's proposals. In September,
1980, the largest state lawyers' group, the State Bar of California, 56 had so
pronounced an "anti-Kutak" consensus at its annual convention that the
only question seriously debated by the Bar Delegates was how their con-
victions could be most tellingly couched. They heard from both Kutak
and Koskoff during the convention. Kutak was all but hooted from the
platform; Koskoff received a standing ovation. (The occasions were sepa-
rate; Kutak refused an invitation to debate.) The California Bar's Confer-
ence of Delegates voted 203-118 to reject a resolution which "could be
construed as meaning that California might eventually support Kutak's
ideas," and approved a Board of Governors resolution "opposing the phi-
losophy" of the MRPC.57
That was not the first time a state bar group had expressed doubts about
the Kutak Commission's work, or even rejected it. Indeed, the reaction of
the bar to the draft MRPC has been generally negative, both as to the
substance of its many recommendations, and as to the form in which the
recommendations were cast. There appears to be a growing consensus in
favor of retaining the format of the 1969 CPR, at least as to the Discipli-
nary Rules which are the guts of the Code. The NOBC is far from alone in
its position that the 1969 codification format is a useful instrument and
should be retained.
Indeed, a stronger argument than NOBC's can be made for extensive
modification, rather than scrapping, of the CPR. The bar counsel appear
to be concerned that if the CPR is entirely replaced, they will have to learn
a new system of rule numbers. They also seem to fear that during the
changeover period there will be unnecessary litigation regarding the issue
of whether particular preamendment conduct, clearly proscribed by the
old Code, has been legitimated by the new Rules and should no longer be
56. Although New York is estimated to have more working lawyers (61,600) than Cali-
fornia (59,896) (Mar., 1980 ABA estimates), it does not have an integrated bar. With 68,464
active, and 6,639 inactive members (Oct. 16, 1980 actual count), the State Bar of California
is exceeded in membership, among American bar groups, only by the ABA.
57. Kulak Rules Are Totalty Rejected at Bar Convention, Los Angeles Daily J., Sept. 30,
1980, at 1, 23.
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prosecuted, or vice versa. If the entire structure of the Code is changed,
will lawyers be properly on notice of some of the changes?58
These are not inconsiderable concerns. Nor is NOBC's fear that a
wholesale change of the Code will lead to years of unnecessary wrangling
over the meaning of the new Rules. Not only would this make the work of
Bar Counsel harder, but it could create unnecessary litigation by reducing
the precedential value of the eleven years of decisions interpreting the 1969
Code. The purpose of any recodification should be to clarify, not to obfus-
cate.
Indeed, the fact is that the 1969 Code substantially clarified the state of
the law of professional conduct for attorneys (despite an overall quality of
draftsmanship reminiscent of IRS regulations), and it continues to do so.
Paradoxically, this basic overall strength is sometimes misinterpreted as a
weakness, because it allows the defects of particular components of the
Code to be more readily obvious. It is not, after all, necessary to redesign
an automobile completely because the clutch or the transmission, or both,
have a poor frequency-of-repair record. The new model will surely have
bugs of its own to be worked out, as every buyer from the first year of a
Detroit production run can attest. There is much merit to the old maxim,
"if it ain't broke, don't fix it." This point may be demonstrated, if one
agrees with the essentially similar basic philosophy of the Kutak Commis-
sion draft and NOBC's Zerfoss Report, by reference to Canon 5 of the
CPR, entitled A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judg-
ment on Behalf of a Client.
The Kutak Commission proposes, according to its cross-reference ta-
ble,59 to divide the seven Disciplinary Rules that now comprise Canon 5
into various segments of some eleven Rules scattered in six parts of the
MRCP. One suspects that this list is incomplete, as the cross-reference for
the Ethical Considerations in Canon 5 adds four more MRCP provi-
sions.6" Even without going into the details, this enumeration demon-
strates that the Kutak recodification is difficult to track.
In contrast, the Zerfoss Report makes it quite clear what NOBC would
retain and change in Canon 5. It proposes no changes whatever in four of
the seven present Disciplinary Rules, DR 5-102 and DR 5-105 through
58. See In re Koffler, 79 A.D.2d 252, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1979), rev'd, - N.Y.2d -, 412
N.E.2d 927 (1980), where the respondents' reliance on what the lower court incorrectly held
to be a mistaken interpretation of Bates, was held to exempt them from discipline. Cf In re
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 552, 554-56 (White, J., concurring) (1968).
59. MRPC at 144.
60. Id at 143-44.
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DR 5-107. It would amend DR 5-101 only by adding a new paragraph. 6'
It would change DR 5-103 by amending and clarifying one paragraph.62
It would similarly revise DR 5-104 only by rewriting one paragraph. 63
And it would propose adding, as a new DR 5-108, an only slightly
modified version of one of the Kutak Commission's more controversial
proposals.64
Whether one agrees with these proposals or not, at least one can under-
stand them. One can see, by holding the new and the old Codes side by
side, exactly how the drafters intend to change the law. And one is inexo-
rably led to agree with the conclusion stated in the preface to The Ameri-
can Lawyer's Code of Conduct: "With all its serious flaws, the Code of
Professional Responsibility is preferable to the Model Rules. 65
The ALCC shares with the MRPC the defect of proposing a wholly new
structure and organization to replace the CPR. Unlike the Kutak Com-
mission's rather turgid product, however, the ALCC balances that defect
with the virtue of clarity of expression, and by its drafters' willingness to
advance alternative proposals. It does not read like the bureaucratic prose
George Orwell dubbed "newspeak, '' 66 as both the CPR and the MRCP
often do. When it makes cross-references to other Rules, it explains them.
Moreover, it contains in Part IX, Responsibilities of Government Lawyers,67
a pioneering attempt to deal with an area of lawyers' conduct that the
MRCP, for all its vaunted focus on the differences between lawyers' re-
sponsibilities in different roles, 68 almost wholly fails to address.69
This demonstrates a basic philosophical divergence between the ALCC
and the MRPC. The MRPC sees all lawyers as having responsibilities
both to their clients and to the legal system-a view much more compati-
ble to the civil law, or to a totalitarian state, than to the adversary system
(and to the concept that a citizen's having interests adversary to the state is
a healthy phenomenon) which is woven into the American constitutional
fabric. The ALCC, taking the contrary view, sees the lawyer as primarily
61. ZERFOSS REPORT, supra note 45, at 39 (ZERFOss REPORT DR 5-101(c) derived from
MRPC Rule 3.1 l(b)).
62. Id at 41 (substituting MRPC Rule 1.9(e) for DR 5-103(B)).
63. Id. at 42 (substituting MRPC Rule 1.9(a) for DR 5-104(A)).
64. Id at 42-44 (incorporating MRPC Rule 1.13 with only technical changes).
65. ALCC, supra note 38, at I (preface by Irwin Birnbaum).
66. G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
67. ALCC Rules 9.1 through 9.17 at 901-03, and "Supplementary Provisions" 9.18
through 9.21 at 904, with Comment and Illustrative Cases at 905-14.
68. MRPC Preamble at 1-2.
69, The only apparent exceptions are MRPC Rules 1. 11, "Government Lawyer Conflict
of Interest," and 3.10, "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor."
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responsible to his or her client; it modifies the duties of government law-
yers to reflect their clients' responsibilities to the system.
The ALCC's special provisions on government lawyers also reflect the
reality, well known to every lawyer who has ever worked for the govern-
ment, that the government lawyer frequently has such responsibility for
government policy that he or she almost becomes the client. As in Ger-
trude Stein's famous dictum about Oakland "There's no there there", the
government lawyer often has no client either to counsel or to consult.
When there is a client such as a county council, or even a President, whose
wishes must be considered, the peculiar constraints of our system of lim-
ited government often leave the lawyer no better off than before if the
government officials' aims are clearly illegal or unconstitutional. In such
situations the government lawyer is bound by an oath of office to uphold
the constitution and laws to such an extent that the difference from private
counsel is not just one of degree; it is a difference in kind.
The ALCC incorporates that difference in a one-sentence Rule: "A law-
yer in public service shall not knowingly violate the rights of any person,
or knowingly tolerate the violation of any person's rights by any other
public employee." 7 One may argue with the specifics of this Rule by say-
ing that it is too broad; the word "rights," it may be said, is too all-encom-
passing. But, the philosophy behind the Rule can scarcely be challenged.
The same may also be said of the remainder of the ALCC Rules, 9.1
through 9.9, which relate solely to prosecutors, and 9.10 through 9.13, ap-
plicable to all "lawyer[s] in public service."
These provisions demonstrate, particularly when contrasted to their
skimpy counterparts in the MRPC, the essentially libertarian bent of the
ALCC. Koskoff's Introduction to the ALCC describes its drafters' work
thus: "We rejected, as best we could, every proposal that would have
weakened the protection of clients' rights."'" Koskoff also portrays the
ALCC as "not just a code of conduct for lawyers, but a bill of rights for
clients."72 That may seem a grandiloquent phrase, but it expresses an im-
portant concept that obviously guided the ALCC drafters, and that seems
to have been intermittently absent from the deliberations of the Kutak
Commission and the NOBC: that the legal profession does not just regu-
late itself when it adopts new rules of professional conduct. Koskoff puts it
thus:
We need to realize, not just intellectually, but in our bones, that
70. ALCC Rule 9.12 at 903.
71. ALCC at v.
72. Id at ii.
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the legal profession exists to serve people, and that, when we
write codes to regulate what lawyers may and may not do, we are
writing legislation that affects the rights of every person in the
country. Just as we cannot regulate trial lawyers apart from other
lawyers, we cannot regulate lawyers without profoundly affecting
their clients, and their potential clients, in the exercise of basic
rights.73
Bates and its progeny demonstrate that rules of professional conduct,
concocted by the organized bar, all too frequently constitute regulation of
the bar, by the bar, and for the bar. That the ABA's substitutes for the
rules invalidated by Bates were also unsatisfactory has been acknowledged
both by the Kutak Commission, which liberalizes them, 7  and by the
NOBC, who advise dropping some restrictions that the Kutak Rules re-
tain.75
We have also seen, in the disciplinary proceedings of the Securities and
Exchange Commission76 and in the pronouncements of various SEC offi-
cials,7 7 that there is substantial danger in having rules for lawyers written
by disciplinary prosecutors and government regulators whose interests are
inherently adverse to the zealous representation of citizens' interests.78 We
have seen the Attorney General oppose even the tentative, modest at-
tempts of the Kutak Commission to place professional restraints on mis-
conduct by prosecutors.79
One is constrained to conclude that the processes heretofore used to pro-
duce standards for lawyers' professional conduct have not served the pub-
lic interest-the interest of American citizens in the functioning of the
legal system that protects and embodies their liberties-as well as they
73. ALCC Introduction at vi.
74. MRPC Rules 9.1 through 9.4, replacing CPR DR 2-101 through 2.105.
75. ZERFOSS REPORT DR 2-101 through 2-104 (deleting DR 2-105). See id at 96, ex-
plaining NOBC's omission of MRPC Rule 9.4.
76. See, e.g., In re Carter & Johnson, 11979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175; In re
Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [19791 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124. See also Touche
Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1979).
77. See, e.g., Freedman vs. Sporkin, Barron's, Oct. 6, 1980, at 7, 16, 18 (Stanley Sporkin,
Director, Division of Enforcement); The Record- Williams Analyzes Corporate Counsel Pro-
visions of Ethics Draft, Legal Times of Washington, Oct. 8, 1979, at 28-29 (Chairman Harold
M. Williams); Lawyers, Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1980, Washington Business, at 10 (Chair-
man Williams).
78. At their 1980 Annual Convention, both the ABA and ATLA adopted resolutions
criticizing federal agency discipline of lawyers. See COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DiscI-
PLINE, ABA, REPORT AND RESOLUTION No. 106 (Annual Convention, Aug. 5-6, 1980,
adopted by House of Delegates); RESOLUTION, ATLA (adopted July 19, 1980 by the Board
of Governors).
79. Letter from Attorney General Civiletti to Professor Geoffrey Hazard, May, 1980
(conveying Department of Justice Comments on the MRPC).
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should. We have progressed beyond the era of the Canons of Professional
Ethics, which were clearly the product of an establishment elite, the ABA
of that time, reflecting its biases and protecting its interests. We have seen
the Canons replaced by a Code of Professional Responsibility that, while it
substantially codified the Canons and perpetuated many of their defects,
was the product of an Association that had begun to become less elitist,
although its councils still consisted primarily of establishment attorneys.
We have seen the greater specificity of that codification lead to the demise,
in the courts, of its most restrictive provisions.
What we are seeing now, in the debate over the revision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, may be the final breakdown of the ABA's de
facto dominance of the standard-setting process. The ABA is no longer the
only national body that can claim to act as a promulgator of uniform ethi-
cal standards for lawyers in all states. Its credibility has been weakened,
and two other national groups have challenged both its authority and the
correctness of its new rules. There is now, as there was not when the Code
was written and promulgated in 1969, a real debate over how it should be
changed, what the new document should look like, and what it ought to
say.
Mr. Kutak and his Commission delude themselves if they truly believe
that this debate is merely "input" into their deliberations. Neither the
Kutak Commission nor the ABA House of Delegates is going to be the
final arbiter of this argument. It will be resolved, as de Toqueville noted,
where all American political questions tend to be resolved: in the courts.
The practice of setting standards of professional conduct for lawyers is
finally catching up with the theory that the state courts determine both the
qualifications, and the disqualifications, for the practice of law.
What remains to be seen is how the state courts will go about the job of
exercising this responsibility. If the three contending views of reform
(Kutak, Koskoff, and NOBC) continue to be embodied in three separate
formats, it seems likely that form will dominate over substance, and that
the format most like that of the present Code (the NOBC Zerfoss Report)
will prevail.
It is also entirely possible that, if the Kutak Commission insists on keep-
ing its proposals in their current form, those proposals will not pass the
ABA House of Delegates. The ABA's imprimatur may no longer be al-
most equivalent to having ethics proposals adopted by the states, but it
would seem to remain a sine qua non for proposals originating within the
ABA. State bar groups are not likely to put the Model Rules before their
state courts if the ABA rejects them. Nor are the courts likely to adopt so
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radical a revision of the Code without state bar recommendations.
Whether either Koskoff's ALCC or the NOBC-Zerfoss Report could com-
mand the support of the ABA House of Delegates or state bars as a com-
plete package is problematical.
Because it is cast in the form of amendments to the current Code, the
Zerfoss Report is the only one of the three versions that could be partially
adopted by a state or approved by the ABA-and also partially rejected.
Among NOBC's proposed amendments to Canon 5,80 for example, only
the addition of a new DR 5-108 is likely to be controversial. But the other
provisions, as incorporated in the Kutak Model Rules, cannot be adopted
piecemeal. Nor can one pick and choose among the reform proposals of
the ALCC, except to accept or reject the two sets of alternative and supple-
mental proposals. Both the Model Rules and ALCC can be considered, as
of this writing,8 only on a take-it-or-leave-it, all-or-nothing basis.
This result is unfortunate because it is likely to lead to a debate, before
the fifty-odd deciding tribunals, in which the soundest, most philosoph-
ically consistent positions will be given short shrift because they are inade-
quately presented. Taken as a package, Professor Freedman's views, as
modified by the Koskoff Commission in the ALCC, stand up well against
those of Professor Hazard, as modified by the Kutak Commission in the
MRPC. The ALCC is thoroughly grounded on the premise, assumed by
the fifth and sixth amendments, that the lawyer is the confidential servant
of the client. Professor Freedman has expounded upon that premise elo-
quently and at length in these pages;82 an exposition that can scarcely be
improved upon. Suffice it to say, for present purposes, that the ALCC em-
bodies a similar conviction that the purpose of American law, and of
American lawyers, is to enable individuals, as clients of lawyers, to pre-
serve and maintain their individual autonomy and responsibility for their
actions.
If it has a contrasting philosophic base, the MRPC seems to rest on an
80. ZERFOSS REPORT, supra note 45, at 37-48.
81. On December 5, 1980, Mr. Kutak issued a status report advising the bench and bar
that the Commission would release "a revised draft" of the MRPC in May, 1981, not in
February as previously proposed. The apparent reason for this change was the Commis-
sion's determination "that its recommendations should be circulated in two formats, one
employing the framework of the January, 1980 Discussion Draft, and one consisting of the
current Code text amended to reflect the Commission's substantive recommendations."
"Dear Colleagues" Letter by Robert J. Kutak, Chairman, ABA Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards, at 7 (Dec. 5, 1980). The report suggests, however, that the Kutak
Commission remains committed to the MRPC format, which it somewhat disingenuously
characterizes as "a more traditional form" than that of the CPR. Id at 6.
82. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 191
(1978).
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unstated conviction that the CPR leaves lawyers too free to do their clients'
bidding when, according to the drafters' judgment, doing otherwise would
better serve the public interest. The ALCC may not be sufficiently explicit
in stating its implicit qualification on client autonomy: that the full and
free exchange of views protected by the attorney-client privilege imposes
on the lawyer a duty to advise the client not to do what the client has a
legal right to do, if the lawyer believes that the public interest, or the cli-
ent's enlightened self-interest, lies in another course of action. But the
MRPC is much further from the mark in its curious assumption that the
public interest is better served by judgmental lawyers, who refuse to do
their clients' bidding when they think their clients' actions are against the
public interest, and in its bizarre suggestions that client confidences should
be revealed whenever to do so would bring the greatest good to the great-
est number. Both ideas smack of the paternalistic attitudes of totalitarian
states, not of American democracy.83
It will serve no purpose for the proponents of the ALCC to win the
academic arguments between these two diametrically opposed concepts of
the lawyer's role, if their views are not put in such a form that, having won
the argument, they can get their views adopted as law. To paraphrase Mr.
Kutak, a4 demonstrating that his Commission is wrong is easy; one is only
perplexed as to how to get the right alternative enforced.
It is an ancient truism of negotiation that the party who writes the basic
draft gains an incalculable advantage. At this stage in the great legal eth-
ics debate, it seems unlikely that the basic format of either the MRPC or
the ALCC can gain acceptance as the new Code over whose details we
shall then go on to haggle. Both the Kutak and Koskoff Commissions
would be well advised to admit defeat on this secondary issue and to ad-
vance their proposals, as NOBC has done, in the form of amendments to
the CPR. Once they do that, the courts will be able to decide who should
win the argument on the merits. Until they do that, we will not have a
debate so much as a confusion of tongues.
It is increasingly clear that the practice of law has become part of inter-
state commerce. The growth of national law firms (including Mr. Kutak's)
is one indication. Jetting across the country-and even to other coun-
tries-to conduct specialized practice is not a phenomenon limited to
superstar trial lawyers, or even to litigation specialists. Over the last two
83. "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
84. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
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decades, revolutionary improvements in long-distance transportation and
communications have combined with the complexity of the law to produce
a new generation of legal specialists with national, or even international,
practices. Moreover, the number of such lawyers is increasing, as is the
number of less specialized lawyers whose practice regularly crosses state
lines.
Given these phenomena, there is a greater need today than there was
yesterday for the standards governing American lawyers' conduct to be
uniform from state to state. Tomorrow the need will be yet greater. The
California lawyer retained by one prospective plaintiff in a multi-victim air
crash, for example, should be under fairly uniform constraints as to what
he or she may do to try to represent as many of the survivors of the disaster
as possible.85 Moreover, in the ensuing settlement negotiations and/or liti-
gation, wherever brought, the lawyers for all the potential defendants
should be subject to similar standards of conduct, and those standards
should not vary widely from one potential litigative forum to another.
Thus, the need for a substantial degree of state-to-state uniformity, in
whatever codes of conduct emerge from the current debate, is manifest.
Given the collapse of the ABA's old imperial order, and the open revolt of
many segments of the bar against the Kutak Commission's proposals, it
seems likely that the ABA will no longer be able to provide such uniform-
ity. It may be able to do so, to some extent and somewhat paradoxically,
through the very Code the Kutak Commission wants it to disavow, as the
NOBC and various state bar groups continue to use the organizational
skeleton of the CPR. Moreover, it may be a healthy sign for the future of
professional conduct standards in the United States if the ABA plays no
more of a role than this indirect one. The House of Delegates is not, if it
ever was, the appropriate deliberative body for extensive debates over dis-
puted questions of legal ethics.
One is constrained to suggest, however, that the courts should take it
upon themselves to create an interstate body, under judicial auspices, for
the purpose of formulating uniform standards of conduct. Such a group
could perform, better than the ABA, the functions the ABA has,faute de
mieux, arrogated to itself. It need not, indeed it should not, be composed
entirely of judges, or even entirely of lawyers. But it should be primarily
responsible to the courts. It should be, in that sense, a judicial body per-
forming the essentially judicial function of regulating the practice of law.86
85. See Hahn v. Boeing Co., No. 47005-7 (Wash,, Dec. 31, 1980), holding that solicita-
tion of clients is not grounds for denying admission, pro hac vice, of plaintiffs' out-of-state
counsel.
86. See In re Florida Bar, 316 So. 2d 45, 47 (Fla. 1975), holding that officials of an
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It is a curious fact, traceable to the English origins of the American legal
system,87 that the American courts have generally been more passive than
active in the development of both disciplinary systems and disciplinary
standards. They have often abdicated, as much as delegated, those func-
tions to local bar associations: only in 1980 did the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York cease to provide the bar counsel, and Grievance
Committee, for Manhattan and the Bronx. Like the ABA, the voluntary
New York City bar had simply assumed, in the absence of any other ap-
propriate group, the tasks now assigned by most state court systems to the
integrated bar.88
We have no national integrated bar, nor should we. But neither should
the courts allow the role of national integrated bar to be played by the
ABA, as it has been in the past. The state courts now have, in the National
Center for State Courts founded in 1971, a national coordinating mecha-
nism. They are no longer an archipelago of fifty-odd insular entities with
no common councils except the Conference of Chief Justices and the Na-
tional Conference of State Court Administrators. The furor generated by
the Kutak Commission proposals, and by the counter-proposals of the
Koskoff Commission and the Organization of Bar Counsel, provide a
unique opportunity for the state courts to assert their theoretical authority
over the standards for lawyers' conduct in a real way. Such tides in the
affairs of men89 come but seldom.
integrated state bar association are "officers of the judicial branch." Cf. Supreme Court of
Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 99 S. Ct. 1967 (1980) (involving attorney fees).
See note 32 supra.
87. See, e.g., People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 471-79, 162 N.E. 487, 490-92
(1928) (Cardozo, C.J.), discussing "[p]recedents far more ancient" than American decisions,
upholding "the power of a court" to conduct "a general inquisition" into allegations of attor-
ney misconduct. Cardozo describes a special "jury" of "officers, clerks and attorneys" ap-
pointed by the Court of Common Pleas in 1567 to inquire into the activities of those he calls
"the ambulance chasers of the day," and the resort to "a like expedient" in 1654. 248 N.Y.
at 474-75, 162 N.E. at 491.
88. See L. MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE As-
SOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1870-1970, 350-80 (1970). See also
Dorf, Disbarment in the United States.- Who Shall Do the Noisome Work?, 12 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROB. I (1975).
89. W. SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, IV, iii. 218-21 (Craig & Bevington eds. 1973).
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